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1 Introduction
This paper develops and estimates a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
where agents are imperfectly informed, as in Woodford (2002). This type of model is well-
suited to explaining highly persistent real e⁄ects of money and delayed e⁄ects on in￿ ation
(Woodford, 2002), which are documented by VAR studies (Christiano et al., 1999, Stock
and Watson, 2001, Christiano et al., 2005). Furthermore, this model has another appealing
feature as it nests a simple model of rational inattention where ￿rms optimally choose what to
pay attention to, subject to an information-processing constraint ￿ la Sims (2003). Whether
these models can generate sluggish real e⁄ects of nominal shocks hinges upon the parameter
values that determine how informed agents are. A shortcoming of the literature is the lack of
empirical guidance in selecting these parameter values. We try to counter this shortcoming
by estimating these parameters through Bayesian methods.
The paper contributes to the existing literature along three dimensions. First, we show
that the estimated model of imperfect information ￿ la Woodford (2002) can account for
the strongly persistent real e⁄ects of monetary disturbances that characterize the impulse
response functions of a benchmark VAR. Second, we present an econometric procedure that
evaluates whether the predictions of the rational inattention model are supported by the
data. Third, by implementing this procedure, we gain insights into how to improve the ￿t
of rational inattention models.
Following Woodford (2002), we assume that ￿rms do not perfectly observe any realiza-
tions of the model variables. There are two state variables in the model: the aggregate
technology and the monetary policy stance. Firms observe idiosyncratic noisy signals re-
garding the state variables and solve a signal extraction problem in order to keep track
of the model variables. Since the signal is noisy, ￿rms do not immediately learn the oc-
currence of monetary disturbances. As a result, the price level fails to adjust enough to
entirely neutralize the real e⁄ects of nominal shocks (Lucas, 1973). Moreover, because ofA Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 3
the idiosyncratic nature of the signals, in the aftermath of a shock ￿rms are also uncertain
about what other ￿rms know that other ￿rms know... that other ￿rms know about that
shock. This feature of the model is termed imperfect common knowledge. When ￿rms ￿nd
it optimal to react to changes of endogenous variables (e.g., in the presence of strategic
complementarity in price setting), a problem of forecasting the forecast of others of the
type envisioned by Townsend (1983b) arises. This feature of the model has been shown to
amplify the persistence in economic ￿ uctuations (Townsend, 1983a, 1983b; Hellwig, 2002;
Adam, 2008; Angeletos and La￿ O, 2008; Rondina, 2008; and Lorenzoni, forthcomingA), and
in the propagation of monetary disturbances to real variables and prices (Phelps, 1970; Lu-
cas, 1972; Woodford, 2002; Adam, 2007; Gorodnichenko, 2008; Ma· ckowiak and Wiederholt,
2008; Nimark, 2008; Paciello, 2008; and Lorenzoni, forthcomingB).1
We evaluate the ￿t of the model with imperfect common knowledge. For this purpose,
we introduce a model that deviates from the one of imperfect common knowledge in only
two respects: (1) all agents are perfectly informed, and (2) ￿rms can optimally adjust their
prices only at random periods, as in Calvo (1983). The last assumption is common to a very
large number of models that have been used as workhorses for monetary policy studies over
the last 25 years. We ￿t both models to a data set that includes U.S. per capita GDP and
the U.S. GDP de￿ ator. First, we ￿nd that the model with imperfect common knowledge ￿ts
the data better than the Calvo model. Second, the model with imperfect information can
largely accommodate the persistent real e⁄ects of monetary shocks implied by a benchmark
VAR. Third, when we replace the mechanism of imperfect common knowledge with that of
sticky prices ￿ la Calvo, we observe that such persistence substantially drops.
We modify the model of imperfect common knowledge so as to allow ￿rms to optimally
choose the variances of signal noise given an information-processing constraint ￿ la Sims
(2003). This model of rational inattention is nested into the model with imperfect common
1See Mankiw and Reis (2002a, 2002b, 2006, 2007), and Reis (2006a, 2006b, 2009) for models with infor-
mation frictions that do not feature imperfect common knowledge but can generate sizeable persistence.A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 4
knowledge. The former model makes predictions over the variances of the signal noise. In the
latter model these variances are instead structural parameters whose values are learned from
the data by estimating the model. We introduce and implement an econometric procedure
that allows us to assess to what extent the predictions of this simple model of rational
inattention are supported by the data. We ￿nd that these predictions are rejected by the
data to some extent. Moreover, this exercise delivers interesting insights on how to improve
the ￿t of rational inattention models. In this respect, we observe that capital accumulation
would be an important feature to be added to these models.
The procedure to evaluate the predictions of the model of rational inattention can be
summarized in four steps. First, we sample with replacement the posterior draws for the
parameters of the model with imperfect common knowledge. Second, for each sampled
draw, we measure how much information ￿rms acquire per unit of time in the model with
imperfect common knowledge. Third, for each sampled draw, we solve the model of rational
inattention by using the output of the second step to determine the tightness of ￿rms￿
information-processing constraint. Fourth, we evaluate whether the variances of signal noise
predicted by the two models are similar.
We depart from Woodford (2002) in two respects. First, our empirical strategy is
likelihood-based, while Woodford (2002) calibrates the parameters of his model. Second,
Woodford￿ s model has one rather than two shocks. Having an additional shock allows us to
get around the problem of stochastic singularity when we evaluate the likelihood function.
Speci￿cally, we consider a nominal shock and an aggregate technology shock.
This paper is also related to the literature of rational inattention (Sims, 2003, 2006;
Luo, 2008; Paciello, 2008; Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2008; Woodford, 2008; and
Ma· ckowiak and Wiederholt, forthcoming). Ma· ckowiak and Wiederholt (2009) introduce a
model where ￿rms optimally decide how much attention to pay to aggregate and idiosyncratic
conditions, subject to a constraint on information ￿ ows. When they calibrate their modelA Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 5
to match the average absolute size of price changes observed in micro data, they ￿nd that
nominal shocks have sizeable and persistent real e⁄ects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents both the model with
imperfect common knowledge and the model of rational inattention, as well as the Calvo
model. Some features of the ￿rst two models are explored in section 3. Section 4 deals with
the empirical analysis. In section 5, we conclude.
2 The models
In this section we describe three DSGE models. The ￿rst model is a model with imperfect
common knowledge (henceforth, ICK model). In this model, information-processing fric-
tions are modelled by assuming that ￿rms have to solve a signal extraction problem in order
to estimate the state of the aggregate technology and that of monetary policy. A feature of
this model is that ￿rms take the stochastic process of signals as given. In the second model
(henceforth, rational inattention model) ￿rms solve the same signal extraction problem
as in the ICK model but they are allowed to optimally choose the variances of signal noise,
subject to an information-processing constraint of the type used in Sims (2003). In the
third model (henceforth, Calvo model) all agents have perfect information but they can
re-optimize their prices only at random periods, as in Calvo (1983). In the ￿rst part of this
section we introduce the equations common to all the models. In the remaining part of the
section, we analyze the speci￿c features of the three models.
2.1 The common structure
The economy is populated by households, ￿nal goods producers (or producers), intermediate
goods ￿rms (or ￿rms), a ￿nancial intermediary, and a monetary authority (or central bank).
Households derive utility from consumption of ￿nal goods and disutility from supplying laborA Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 6
to the intermediate goods ￿rms. Furthermore, households face a cash-in-advance (CIA)
constraint. The ￿nal goods producers are perfectly competitive with a CES production
function. The intermediate goods ￿rms operate in a monopolistic competitive environment
with a production function that is linear in its unique input, which is labor. Furthermore,
there are two shocks: an aggregate productivity shock that a⁄ects intermediate goods ￿rms￿
technology and a monetary policy shock.
At the beginning of period t, the households inherit the entire money stock of the economy,
Mt. They decide how much money Dt to deposit at the ￿nancial intermediary. These deposits
yield interest at rate RH;t ￿1. The ￿nancial intermediary receives household deposits and a
monetary injection from the monetary authority, which it lends to ￿nal goods producers at
rate RF;t￿1. The intermediate goods ￿rms hire labor services from households and produce
their output. The ￿rms sell their output to the ￿nal goods producers and use the proceeds
to pay wages, WtHt, where Wt is the nominal hourly wage, and Ht is hours worked, and
dividends, ￿t, to households. Households￿cash balance increases to Mt ￿ Dt + WtHt + ￿t.
The CIA constraint requires that households pay for all consumption purchases with the
accumulated cash balances. The producers sell the ￿nal goods to households and then pay
back their loans. Finally, households receive back their deposits inclusive of interest rate and
the net cash in￿ ow of the ￿nancial intermediary as dividend ￿b
t.
2.1.1 The representative household







s [lnCt+s ￿ ￿Ht+s]
such thatA Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 7
PtCt ￿ Mt ￿ Dt + WtHt + ￿t (1)
0 ￿ Dt (2)
Mt+1 = (Mt ￿ Dt + WtHt + ￿t ￿ PtCt) + RH;tDt + ￿
b
t (3)
where Ct is the amount of the ￿nal good consumed at time t, Pt is the price of the ￿nal good
at time t, and ￿ is the discount factor.
2.1.2 The technology of the intermediate goods ￿rms
Every intermediate goods ￿rm has the same technology:
Yi;t = AtNi;t (4)
where Yi;t is the output produced by the ￿rm i at time t, and Ni;t is the labor input demanded
by ￿rm i at time t.
We further assume that the aggregate productivity At follows a random walk with drift:
lnAt = lna + lnAt￿1 + ￿a"a;t (5)
where "a;t v N (0;1). Finally, it turns out to be useful to de￿ne:
at ￿ lnAt ￿ lna ￿ t (6)
2.1.3 The ￿nal goods producers
The representative ￿nal goods producer combines a continuum of intermediate goods indexed










where the parameter ￿ is assumed to be strictly larger than unity.
The producer takes input prices P i
t and output price Pt as given. Furthermore, it has to

























2.1.4 The ￿nancial intermediary
















t = Dt + RF;tLt ￿ RH;tDt ￿ Lt + Xt (11)
Lt ￿ Xt + Dt (12)
where Qt is the time 0 value of a unit of the consumption good in period t to the representative
household and Xt = Mt+1 ￿ Mt is the monetary injection.A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 9
2.1.5 The monetary authority
The monetary authority sets the growth rate of money so as to ensure that a log-linear
combination of output and price level follows an exogenous process of the following type:
￿ln￿t = (1 ￿ ￿￿)￿
￿ + ￿￿￿ln￿t￿1 + ￿￿"￿;t (13)
with "￿;t v N (0;1) and
ln￿t = ￿lnYt + lnPt (14)
where ￿ stands for the ￿rst-di⁄erence operator, the degree of smoothness in conducting
monetary policy ￿￿ is such that ￿￿ 2 [0;1). ￿￿ is a parameter that represents the long-run
average growth rate of ln￿t. Moreover, the monetary policy shock "￿;t is assumed to be
orthogonal to the productivity shock "a;t. Finally, it is useful to denote:
mt ￿ ln￿t ￿ ￿
￿ ￿ t (15)
2.2 ICK model
In the ICK model, intermediate goods ￿rms do not face any cost when they adjust their
prices. Nonetheless, they cannot observe any realizations of the model variables. Firms
observe idiosyncratic noisy signals concerning the state of technology lnAt and that of mon-
etary policy ln￿t. Therefore, they will estimate the model variables by using the history of
realizations of their signals. For tractability, it is assumed that the other agents perfectly
observe the past and the current realizations of the model variables.



































where Qt is the time 0 value of a unit of the consumption good in period t to the representative
household, which is treated as exogenous by the ￿rm. Ii
t is the information set available to
￿rm i at time t. This set contains the history of the idiosyncratic signals fzi;￿g
t
￿=￿1 and the
vector of model parameters ￿I, that is
￿I ￿ (￿;￿￿;￿;lna;￿
￿;￿;￿;￿￿;￿a;￿e1;￿e2) (19)
It is important to emphasize that we assume that at time 0 ￿rms are endowed with an in￿nite
sequence of signals. This assumption simpli￿es the analysis. Furthermore, the equilibrium
laws of motion of all model variables are assumed to be common knowledge among ￿rms.

























where zi;t ￿ [z1;i;t;z2;i;t]
0 ; ei;t ￿ [e1;i;t;e2;i;t]
0 and
ei;t











Note that at and mt are the state variables of the model and the signal noises e1;i;t and e2;i;tA Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 11
are assumed to be iid across ￿rms and time.
Assuming that the two signals are orthogonal may be considered a strong assumption.
After all, ￿rms might learn about a given state variable by processing signals concerning
the other state variable. We ￿nd, however, that relaxing this assumption of orthogonality of
signals does not substantially a⁄ect the main predictions of the estimated model.
Finally, one should notice that, as in Woodford (2002), ￿rms are assumed to perfectly
observe neither the amount of labor hired Ni;t nor the quantity sold Yi;t. They are able to get
information about these variables indirectly through their estimates of the state variables.
2.3 The rational inattention model
The model of rational inattention relies on three fundamental assumptions. First, informa-
tion about all model variables is freely available to decision makers. Second, information
needs to be processed before being used for decision-making. Third, intermediate goods
￿rms face limitations on the amount of information they can process per unit of time. As
a result, ￿rms will optimally decide how much information they want to acquire about each
variable that matters for their price-setting decisions. For tractability, it is assumed that the
other agents do not face any information-processing constraints.
In full-￿ edged models of rational inattention (e.g., Ma· ckowiak and Wiederholt, forthcom-
ing), agents optimally choose the stochastic process of signals, subject to an information-
processing constraint ￿ la Sims (2003). Unlike these models, we parametrically restrict the
set of signal processes that ￿rms can select. Speci￿cally, we assume that ￿rms optimally
choose among signals that follow a "true state plus white noise Gaussian error" process.
Hence, what ￿rms are allowed to choose are the variances of signals in equations (20)-(21).
Nevertheless, one can show that the signal process (20)-(21) is not optimal if pro￿t function
is not quadratic or ￿ is not equal to unity (Ma· ckowiak and Wiederholt, forthcoming, sections
6 and 7). We introduce these parametric restrictions for tractability. Moreover, we assumeA Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 12
that ￿rms can choose the stochastic process of signals at time 0 but they cannot reconsider
their decision thereafter. In section 3:2, we will show that this last assumption is not critical
for our results.



























































































￿m;i;t + ￿a;i;t ￿ ￿; any t > 0 (28)
where ￿R is a vector including all the parameters of the model,
￿R ￿ (￿;￿￿;￿;lna;￿
￿;￿;￿;￿￿;￿a;￿) (29)
The variables ￿m;i;t and ￿a;i;t denote the information ￿ ow from signal z1;i;t to the state of
monetary policy, mt, and that from signal z2;i;t to the state of technology, at, respectively.
Moreover, the parameter ￿ quanti￿es the overall amount of information ￿rms can process in
each period. Finally, we de￿ne the vector zi;t ￿ [z1;i;t;z2;i;t]
0.A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 13
Notice that ￿rms have to solve two problems: a price-setting problem and a problem of
how to allocate their attention between the two state variables. In the problem of allocating
the attention, ￿rms optimally choose the variances of signal noise. Notice that when ￿rms
decide how to allocate their attention, they are aware that this choice will a⁄ect the objective
function (23) and in turn the optimal price-setting policy. Moreover, conditional to these
variances of signal noise, rationally inattentive ￿rms face the same price-setting problem as
that in the ICK model.
The information set (25) is of the same type as that in the ICK model. Equations (26)-
(27) restrict the set of signal processes that can be chosen by ￿rms to be "true state plus
white noise Gaussian error" processes. The information-processing constraint (28) sets an
upper bound ￿ 2 R+ on the overall amount of information ￿rms can gather at any time t.





































are the conditional entropies of the state variable mt and
at, given the history of signals up to time ￿, z￿
i. In information theory (Shannon, 1948),
entropy is an axiomatic measure of conditional uncertainty about random variables (Ash,
1990). For instance, the entropy of mt conditional to the sequence of signals zt



















is the conditional probability density






































See Cover and Thomas (1991). The unit of measure of these conditional entropies and
consequently that of information ￿ ows ￿m;i;t and ￿a;i;t is 1 bit.2 Moreover, as in the ICK
model, we assume that the equilibrium laws of motion of all variables are common knowledge.
2.4 A sticky price model ￿ la Calvo (1983)
In the Calvo model all agents perfectly observe the past and current realizations of the
model variables. Moreover, the prices charged by each ￿rm are re-optimized only at random
periods. The key (simplifying) assumption is that the probability that a given ￿rm will adjust
its price within a particular period is independent of the state of the model, the current price
charged, and how long ago it was last re-optimized. Firms that do not re-optimize index
their prices at the balance-growth-path in￿ ation rate.
We assume that only a fraction (1 ￿ ￿p) of ￿rms re-optimize their prices, while the re-
maining ￿p fraction does not reset them. The problem of the intermediate goods ￿rms that





























where Qt+s is the marginal utility of a unit of consumption at time t + s in terms of the
utility of the representative household at time t, and MCt+s stands for the nominal marginal
costs in period t + s. We consider only the symmetric equilibrium at which all ￿rms will
2If we had used the natural logarithm instead of the logarithm of base two in equation (32)-(33), these
quantities would have been measured in nats.A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 15
choose the same optimal price P i
t = P ￿











where ￿￿ is the balance-growth-path (gross) in￿ ation rate. We denote ￿C as the set of
parameters of the Calvo model:
￿C ￿ (￿;￿￿;￿;lna;￿
￿;￿;￿;￿p;￿￿;￿a) (37)
3 Log-linearization and features of the models
All the models presented in the previous section are log-linearized before being solved. The
exogenous processes (5) and (13) induce both a deterministic and a stochastic trend to all
endogenous variables, except labor. We will detrend the non-stationary variables before
















In order to log-linearize the models with information frictions,3 we take the following
steps. First, we derive the price-setting equation by solving the intermediate goods ￿rms￿
problem in both models with information frictions. Second, we transform the variables
according to the de￿nitions (38). Third, we log-linearize the resulting price-setting equation
around the perfect-information symmetric steady state. Henceforth, when we refer to the
three models we mean their log-linear approximations.
3How to log-linearize and solve the Calvo model is standard and hence omitted. We use the routine
gensys developed by Sims (2002) to numerically solve this model.A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 16
3.1 Quantifying the size of information frictions in the ICK model
The following de￿nitions turn out to be useful for evaluating the size of the information
frictions in the log-linear ICK model.
De￿nition: Firms￿overall level of attention { is the amount of information that ￿rms
process about both state variables in the unit of time.
De￿nition: Firms￿allocation of attention to a given state variable is the ratio of the amount
of processed information about that state variable to the overall level of attention.
The overall level of attention { is de￿ned as { ￿ ￿m+￿a, where ￿m and ￿a are computed
exactly as the information ￿ ows in equations (30)-(33). The quantities {, ￿m and ￿a turn out
not to vary across periods and ￿rms4 and are all measured in bits. Moreover, the allocation
of attention to the state of technology ￿a can be computed as follows: ￿a ￿ ￿a
{ .
Characterizing the parameter { and ￿a for the log-linearized ICK model requires comput-
ing the conditional variances of mt and at in equations (32)-(33) for a given set of parameters
￿I. In order to numerically pin down these variances, one has to apply the Kalman ￿lter to
the state-space model whose transition equations are given by equations (5) and (13) and
the measurement equations are de￿ned by equations (20)-(21). We can concisely represent
this result through the mapping ￿I:
({;￿m;￿a)
0 = ￿I (￿I) (39)
We denote the pair of information ￿ ows (￿m;￿a) as ￿rms￿allocation of attention in the ICK
model.











, ￿ 2 ft;t ￿ 1g any t > 0, do not change over time. Moreover, in the ICK
model, these conditional variances are the same across ￿rms because ￿rms face the same variances of signal
noise and all shocks are Gaussian. If these variances do not change across periods and ￿rms, neither do
information ￿ ows ￿m and ￿a. See equations (32)-(33).A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 17
3.2 Some property of the rational inattention model
In the log-linear rational inattention model, ￿rms￿pro￿t function is log-quadratic. It can
be shown that when the pro￿t function is quadratic, the optimal signal is Gaussian (Sims,
2003). This implies that the assumption we made in section 2:3 that signals follow a Gaussian
process is not critical.
In section 2:3, we also assumed that ￿rms decide their allocation of attention at time 0.
They are not allowed to reconsider the allocation of attention in any subsequent periods.
If ￿rms￿pro￿t function is quadratic, this assumption does not give rise to a problem of
time inconsistency of ￿rms￿policies. The reason behind this result is as follows.5 When
￿rms￿pro￿t function is quadratic, it can be shown that the allocation-of-attention problem
(22)-(28) turns out to be that of choosing the variances of signal noise so as to minimize
the conditional variance of the pro￿t-maximizing price under perfect information (i.e., when
￿ ! 1). This conditional variance does not change over time in periods t > 0 because ￿rms
receive an in￿nite sequence of signals at time t = 0 and the rational inattention model is
linear and Gaussian. Therefore, the objective function of the allocation-of-attention problem
does not change over time, and hence, ￿rms do not have any incentives to reconsider their
allocation of attention in periods t > 0.
Moreover, if their pro￿t function is quadratic, the optimal variances of signal noise can
be shown to be the same across ￿rms. Since all shocks are Gaussian and ￿rms receive an
in￿nite sequence of signals at time t = 0, the conditional variance of the pro￿t-maximizing
price under perfect information is the same for all ￿rms. Therefore, in a quadratic-Gaussian
framework, the objective function of the allocation-of-attention problem is the same across
￿rms. Thus, every ￿rm will ￿nd it optimal to choose the same allocation of attention. The









5A more detailed proof of this result is provided in Ma· ckowiak and Wiederholt (2009).A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 18
3.3 Nestedness of the ICK and the rational inattention model
For any given ￿ 2 R+, the rational inattention model is nested within the ICK model and sets
restrictions upon the variances of signal noise, ￿2
e1 and ￿2
e2, in the latter model. Equivalently,
for given ￿ 2 R+, the rational inattention model can be seen as casting restrictions upon
￿rms￿allocation of attention (￿m;￿a) in the ICK model through the mapping ￿I. Therefore,











where we denote the ￿￿
m;￿￿
a as the information ￿ ows predicted by the rational inattention
model and the set ~ ￿R as the set of parameters in ￿R except ￿. Note that ~ ￿R is a subset of
￿I.
The following two facts are useful for removing the degree of freedom associated with
assigning a value to the parameter ￿. First, as showed in section 3:1, given the parameter
values of the ICK model, we can quantify the overall level of attention { in this model through
the mapping ￿I. Second, when the objective function of the allocation-of-attention problem
is quadratic, the information-processing constraint (28) is always binding. Therefore, we can
eliminate the degree of freedom by restricting the parameter ￿ to be equal to ￿rms￿overall











where { is determined by the function ￿I in equation (39). Finally, note that the mapping
￿R is now a function of only the parameters in ￿I.A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 19
3.4 Solving linear models with information frictions
A typical challenge in ￿nding a rational expectation equilibrium (REE) in models with imper-
fect common knowledge is dealing with an in￿nite-dimensional state vector. Hence, ￿nding
an REE in the models with information frictions would require characterizing in￿nitely many
equilibrium laws of motion (in￿nite regress). This task is clearly unmanageable. In the two
models with information frictions, this problem solely arises when there is strategic comple-
mentarity in price-setting. Moreover, in these two models this issue can be elegantly resolved
as in Woodford (2002) who suggests a method that can be applied to numerically solve the
ICK model.
The rational inattention model is solved in four steps. First, we guess the values of the
variances of signal noise, ￿2
e1 and ￿2
e2. Second, given this guess, we numerically characterize
the law of motion of the price level exactly as we do when solving the ICK model. Third,








￿2, by solving the quadratic
approximation of the allocation-of-attention problem in (22)-(28). Fourth, we check whether
the guess made in the ￿rst step is correct, that is, whether
￿ ￿ ￿￿ej ￿ ￿￿
ej
￿ ￿ ￿ < ", for j 2 f1;2g
with " > 0 and small. If this criterion is not satis￿ed, we do another loop by setting ￿ej = ￿￿
ej,
for j 2 f1;2g. Otherwise, we stop.
4 Empirical analysis
This section contains the econometric analysis of the paper. We take the ICK model and the
Calvo model to the data through Bayesian techniques. We do not directly estimate the ra-
tional inattention model, since obtaining a reliable approximation of posterior distributions
does not turn out to be possible. Nevertheless, we present and implement an econometric
procedure that formally evaluates to what extent the predictions of the rational inattention
model over ￿rms￿allocation of attention are supported by the data. This exercise is inter-A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 20
esting for two reasons. First, as shown by Woodford (2002), ￿rms￿allocation of attention
crucially a⁄ects the di⁄erential responsiveness of prices to di⁄erent types of disturbances
in models with information processing frictions. Second, this exercise can detect sources of
misspeci￿cation of rational inattention models and delivers insights on how to improve the
￿t of models of this variety.
4.1 The data
The data are quarterly and range from the third quarter of 1954 to the fourth quarter of 2005.
We use the U.S. per capita real GDP and the U.S. GDP de￿ ator from Haver Analytics (Haver
mnemonics are in italics). Per capita real GDP is obtained by dividing the nominal GDP
(GDP) by the population 16 years and older (LN16N) and de￿ ating using the chained-price
GDP de￿ ator (JGDP). The GDP de￿ ator is given by the appropriate series (JGDP).
4.2 Measurement equations
Denote the U.S. per capita real GDP, and the U.S. GDP de￿ ator as fGDPt; t = 1;2;:::Tg,
and fDEFLt; t = 1;2;:::Tg, respectively. The measurement equations are:
lnGDPt = b yt + at + lna ￿ t + lny (42)
lnDEFLt = b pt + mt ￿ ￿at + (￿
￿ ￿ ￿lna) ￿ t + lnp (43)
where the subscript b means log-deviations of a variable from its perfect-information sym-
metric steady-state value, lny is the logarithm of the steady-state value of yt, and lnp is the
logarithm of the steady-state value of pt.
The Kalman ￿lter can be used to evaluate the likelihood function of the models. Yet,
the ￿lter must be initialized and a distribution for the state vector in period t = 0 hasA Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 21
to be speci￿ed. As far as the vector of stationary state variables is concerned, we use
their unconditional distributions. We cannot initialize the vector of non-stationary state
variables (i.e. mt;at) in the same manner, since their unconditional variance is not de￿ned.
We follow the approach introduced by Chang et al. (2007), who propose to factorize the
initial distribution as p(s1;t)p(s2;t), where s1;t and s2;t are the vector of stationary and non-
stationary variables, respectively. They suggest setting the ￿rst component p(s1;t) equal to
the unconditional distribution of s1;t, whereas the second component p(s2;t) is absorbed into
the speci￿cation of the prior.
4.3 Priors for the model parameters
We use the same prior distributions for those parameters that are common across models.
We ￿x the value of ￿ equal to 10. This implies a mark-up of about 11%, which is in line
with what is suggested by Woodford (2003). Table 1 elicits the prior distributions for the
parameters used in both the ICK model and the Calvo model.
In the ICK model, the parameter ￿ entirely gauges the strategic complementarity in price




. As shown by Woodford (2002), this crucially a⁄ects
the persistence in the mechanism of shock propagation in the ICK model. Hence, we set
a broad prior for this parameter in order to educe its value from the likelihood. The prior
median is set at ￿ = 6:67 so that the model exhibits the degree of strategic complementarity
suggested by Woodford (2003).
We note that, conditional to ￿, we observe ln￿t. Hence, the autoregressive parameter
of monetary policy, ￿￿, the standard deviation of the monetary policy shock, ￿￿, and the
trend ￿￿ are directly estimated when ￿ is set equal to its prior median. We center the priors
for these three parameters accordingly. Furthermore, we set broad prior intervals for these
parameters.
The prior of the standard deviation of the productivity shock, ￿a, is centered at 0:007.A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 22
This value is regarded as plausible by the real business cycle literature (Prescott, 1986).
Moreover, we center the prior for lna consistently with the estimated linear trend of the
U.S. per capita real output.
In absolute terms, we set the priors for standard deviations of signal noise, ￿e1, and
￿e2, so as to ensure that signals are quite informative about the business-cycle variations
of model variables.6 In relative terms, these prior speci￿cations are chosen so as to make
each signal equally informative about the corresponding state variable. More speci￿cally, we
want the prior median of the allocation of attention, ￿a, to be approximately equal to 0:5.
The 90% con￿dence interval for ￿a is broad, ranging from 0:16 to 0:88. The rationale of
such a large con￿dence range is that allocation of attention is a crucial parameter a⁄ecting
the di⁄erential responsiveness of prices to di⁄erent types of disturbances. Thus, we aim at
learning the value of ￿a from the likelihood.
The discount factor, ￿, is well known in the literature, and hence we set its prior standard
deviation relatively small. The prior con￿dence interval for ￿ includes 0:99, which is a
plausible discount factor when the model periods are interpreted as quarters (Woodford,
2002). The prior for the Calvo parameter ￿p is centered at 0:67, implying an average duration
of price contracts of three quarters. This value is regarded as consistent with the survey
evidence discussed in Blinder et al. (1998). The parameter ￿ is not identi￿able, since we do
not have hours worked among our observables.
4.4 Posteriors for parameters in the ICK and the Calvo model
Given the priors and the likelihood functions implied by the models, a closed-form solution
for the posterior distributions for parameters cannot be derived. However, we are able to
evaluate the posteriors numerically through the random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm.
6We achieve that by setting the prior medians of the coherences between the process of the state variables,
in ￿rst di⁄erence, and their corresponding signals such that these are not smaller than 0:50 at business-cycle
frequencies (3-5 years). The coherence ranges from 0 to 1 and measures the degree to which two stationary
stochastic processes are jointly in￿ uenced by cycles of a given frequency (Hamilton, 1994).A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 23
How these procedures apply to macro DSGE models is exhaustively documented by An and
Schorfheide (2007). We generate 1;000;000 draws from the posteriors. The posterior medians
and 95% con￿dence intervals are shown in table 2. The posterior median of the Calvo
parameter ￿p implies that ￿rms reset their prices about every four years. This frequency
of price adjustments is implausible, according to the existing microeconometric analyses on
price changes. Nonetheless, this result is not surprising. In fact, it is well-known that small-
scale DSGE models with sticky prices ￿ la Calvo can match the persistence of the macro
data only with price contracts of very long duration (Bils and Klenow, 2004). We might ￿x
this problem by setting a tighter prior for the Calvo parameter, but we ￿nd that this would





controls the degree of strategic complementarity in price set-
tings. As shown by Woodford (2002), this coe¢ cient is very important, since it a⁄ects the





was set at 0:84. Hence, Bayesian updating points
toward a lower strategic complementarity than what is conjectured in the prior. This tends
to reduce the persistence in the mechanism of shock propagation.
Moreover, the posterior median of the signal-to-noise ratio regarding the state of monetary
policy, ￿e1=￿￿, is large relative to that associated with the state of technology, ￿e2=￿a. These
estimates imply that the signal regarding the state of technology conveys more information
than the signal concerning the state of monetary policy. In table 2, we also report the
posterior moments for the allocation of attention (i.e. {, ￿m, and ￿a) in the ICK model. We
￿nd that ￿rms can process up to 0:27 bits per quarter. About 84% of the overall level of
attention is allocated to the state of technology. In every quarter, ￿rms acquire 0:04 bits of
information about the state of monetary policy and 0:23 bits about the state of technology.A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 24
4.5 Evaluating the ￿t of the ICK model
In this section, we assess how accurately the ICK model ￿ts the data relative to the Calvo
model. Moreover, we introduce a VAR that can be considered a benchmark because it ￿ts
the data better than these two DSGE models. We then evaluate the ICK model and the
Calvo model in terms of their capability of accommodating features of the IRFs implied by
the identi￿ed VAR.
4.5.1 MDD-based comparisons
From a Bayesian perspective, the issue of whether the ICK model ￿ts the data better than
the Calvo model can be addressed by comparing the marginal data densities (MDDs) of
these two models (Kass and Raftery, 1995 and An and Schorfheide, 2007). Let us denote
the ICK model and the Calvo model with MI and MC, respectively. The data used for
































where L(￿) stands for the likelihood function, and p(￿j￿) denotes the posterior distribution.
The model with the largest marginal data density is the one that ￿ts the data better. We
use Geweke￿ s harmonic mean estimator (Geweke, 1999) to approximate the MDDs of these
two DSGE models.
Moreover, we also consider a VAR(4):
~ Yt = ￿0 + ￿1~ Yt￿1 + ￿2~ Yt￿2 + ￿3~ Yt￿3 + ￿4~ Yt￿4 + ￿t (46)A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 25
where ~ Yt = [lnGDPt;lnDEFLt]
0 and ￿￿ ￿ E(￿t￿0
t). We ￿t this VAR(4) to the same data
set as that presented in section 4:1. The Minnesota random walk prior (Doan et al., 1984)
is implemented in order to obtain a prior distribution for the VAR parameters. Moreover,
we obtain 100;000 posterior draws through Gibbs sampling. In order to compute the MDD
of the VAR model we apply the method introduced by Chib (1995).
Table 3 shows that the two DSGE models are clearly misspeci￿ed, since the VAR strongly
outperforms both of them in ￿tting the data. Nonetheless, the ICK model can be regarded
as the best model in approximating the true probability distribution of the data generat-
ing process under the Kullback-Leibler distance (FernÆndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ram￿rez,
2004).
4.5.2 IRF-based comparisons
We will assess the reliability of both the ICK model and the Calvo model in predicting how
observables react to structural shocks. Since the VAR ￿ts the data better than the two
DSGE models, we can use the former as a valid benchmark to compare the IRFs of the
latter. This exercise has the potential to highlight important sources of misspeci￿cation of
these two DSGE models.
Let us consider the VAR(4) we introduced in the previous section. As a ￿rst step, we
need to identify the shocks of this VAR. To ￿x notation, let us denote with ￿￿ the matrix
such that ￿t = ￿￿ut, where ut = ["￿;t;"a;t]
0 is the vector of structural shocks in the DSGE
models. We can decompose ￿￿ = AA
0 and introduce an orthonormal matrix ~ ￿, which is
characterized by the rotation parameter ~ ’ 2 (￿￿;￿]. Hence, we can write ￿￿ = A~ ￿(~ ’).
The problem of identi￿cation boils down to that of characterizing the rotation parameter ~ ’.
Natural candidates of identi￿cation schemes for the VAR can be derived from the re-
striction (14). Nonetheless, we ￿nd that solely using this restriction delivers VAR IRFs of
output to nominal shocks with implausibly large persistence. Mixing conditions derived fromA Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 26
the monetary policy setting of the two DSGE models and restrictions, which are consistent
with other large-scale VAR studies, ￿xes this problem. The restrictions are presented in
table 4. In this table, the monetary policy (MP) restriction is derived from the condition
(14). Restriction A is consistent with the ￿ndings of Christiano et al. (2005), who estimate
a large-scale VAR. Restriction B accords with both the ICK model and the Calvo model
where real e⁄ects of monetary disturbances vanish in the long run. The purpose of the last
restriction is to curb the excess persistence that would otherwise a⁄ect the VAR IRF of
real output to nominal shocks. Let us express the rotation parameter that satis￿es the MP
restriction as ~ ’￿. Moreover, for a given set of VAR parameters (￿;A), the restrictions A
and B characterize a set of values for the hyperparameter ~ ’, which we denote as ~ ￿. If this














, such that ~ ￿ = [M
j=1~ ￿i. The prior for ~ ’j￿;A is speci￿ed as follows: if ~ ￿
is an empty set for given VAR parameters (￿;A), prob(~ ’ = ~ ’￿j￿;A) = 1. If ~ ￿ is not an
empty set for given VAR parameters (￿;A),










































stands for the uniform distribution with mass between ~ ￿
L
i and ~ ￿
H
i . Since
the data are not informative about ~ ’, we trivially have thatA Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 27
p
￿
~ ’j￿;A; ~ Y
￿
= p(~ ’j￿;A) (51)














Note that the conditional posteriors on the right-hand-side are known. Therefore, we can
draw from the joint posterior by using some data-augmentation-based Monte Carlo methods.
In order to fully characterize the MP restriction, we need to set a value for ￿. The
posterior medians of ￿ implied by the ICK model and the Calvo model di⁄er. It seems
appropriate to ￿x ￿ = 2, since this value lies between the posterior medians in the two
DSGE models. Nevertheless, all the results below do not signi￿cantly change by setting
values for ￿ within an interval ranging from 1:80 and 2:16.
The IRFs of real output and in￿ ation to a two-standard-deviation nominal shock implied
by the VAR and the two DSGE models are plotted in ￿gures 1 and 2, respectively. As also
found by other studies (e.g., Christiano et al., 2005), the VAR-based IRFs document highly
persistent real e⁄ects of monetary disturbances. Figure 1 highlights that the Calvo model
does not seem to be well-suited to accounting for such strong persistence, whereas the ICK
model appears to be substantially more successful in this respect. Moreover, it is worthwhile
noticing that the IRF of real output implied by the ICK model peaks three quarters after
the occurrence of the shock, exactly as suggested by the benchmark VAR. On the contrary,
the Calvo model predicts that the largest response of real output arises two quarters after
the occurrence of the shock.
The VAR IRFs emphasize the presence of delayed e⁄ects of monetary shocks on in￿ ation,
which can be partially accommodated by the two DSGE models. Furthermore, we obtain
that the IRFs of in￿ ation implied by the two DSGE models basically overlap except at timeA Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 28
0. The contemporaneous response of in￿ ation to a monetary policy shock seems to be better
captured by the ICK model. Moreover, the IRF of in￿ ation implied by the VAR reaches its
peak after four quarters, while, according to the two DSGE models, this happens after three
quarters.
Finally, by following Schorfheide (2008), we compute the relative reaction of in￿ ation
and output in response to a monetary disturbance implied by the ICK model, the Calvo
model, and the VAR. This exercise makes the IRFs in ￿gures 1 and 2 comparable with those
implied by other DSGE models that have been estimated in the literature. We ￿nd that a
1% increase in output due to a monetary policy shock triggers an increase in the quarter-
to-quarter in￿ ation rate that ranges from 8-9 basis points for both the ICK model and the
Calvo model, as well as the VAR. Schorfheide (2008) reports that a number of leading New
Keynesian DSGE models predicts that this ratio ranges from 7 to 140 basis points. Thus,
the degree of price ￿ exibility predicted by the models presented in this paper is consistent
with the New-Keynesian literature, even though it is relatively small.
4.6 Evaluating the predictions of the rational inattention model
In section 3:3, we showed that the rational inattention model is nested within the ICK model
and sets restrictions on ￿rms￿allocation of attention (￿m, ￿a) of the ICK model. The mapping
￿R in equation (41) summarizes these restrictions. Since this mapping ￿R is a function of
only the parameters in ￿I, we can use the posterior draws for the ICK model parameters so
as to approximate the posterior distributions for the rational inattention model￿ s predictions
over ￿￿
m and ￿￿
a. More precisely, we implement the following procedure:
1. Sample with replacement the posterior draws we obtained when we estimated the ICK








2. For each sampled draw ￿
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3. For each sampled draw ￿
(j)
I and associated level of attention {(j), use the mapping ￿R


















R includes the j-th draw of parameters that belongs to ~ ￿R, de￿ned in section
3:3. Recall that ~ ￿R is a subset of ￿I.
In practice, we set the total number of draws M equal to 1;000. In ￿gure 3 we plot
the posterior draws for parameters ￿m;￿a implied by the ICK model (￿lled circles) and
those for the rational inattention model￿ s predictions ￿￿
m;￿￿
a (empty squares) as well as the




lie above the 45-degree
line. This result accords well with the ￿ndings presented in section 4:4: the estimated ICK
model predicts that ￿rms allocate most of their attention to the state of technology. The
rational inattention model predicts a rather balanced allocation of attention between these
two shocks.
Two main factors drive the optimal allocation of attention in the rational inattention
model. First, ceteris paribus, ￿rms will allocate more attention to that state variable that
a⁄ects more ￿rms￿expected pro￿t function. Second, ceteris paribus, ￿rms pay more attention
to the state variable whose dynamics are more volatile because it is harder to keep track of it.
Recall that the posterior median of the standard deviation of monetary shocks is larger than
that of technology shocks (see table 2). Hence, the second e⁄ect acts to push the posterior
draws for the restricted parameters ￿￿
m;￿￿
a below the 45-degree line in ￿gure 3. If the second
e⁄ect were prevailing, the rational inattention model would predict that ￿rms allocate more
attention to the state of monetary policy. We do not observe such an outcome in ￿gure 3.
Therefore, the two e⁄ects act in opposite directions.A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 30
Finally, since the allocation of attention predicted by the rational inattention model is
very balanced between the two state variables, we conclude that the two e⁄ects almost
completely o⁄set each other. This insight suggests that even though the predictions of the
rational inattention model seem to be at odds with the data, there is room for improvement.
After all, the extent to which the state of technology a⁄ects ￿rms￿expected pro￿ts is de-
termined by only one parameter, that is, ￿. Making ￿rms￿pro￿t function less stylized has
the potential to improve the ￿t of the model. For instance, if one allowed ￿rms to accumu-
late capital, their expected pro￿t function would be relatively more a⁄ected by technology
shocks. Thus this would reinforce the ￿rst e⁄ect in a way that would push the posterior
draws in ￿gure 3 above the 45-degree line.
5 Concluding remarks
We introduce a DSGE model with imperfect common knowledge in the sense of Woodford
(2002). The peculiar feature of this model is that ￿rms do not perfectly observe the real-
izations of model variables. What ￿rms observe is the history of idiosyncratic noisy signals
regarding the state variables of the model, which are the aggregate technology and the mon-
etary policy stance. Firms have to estimate the dynamics of the model variables by solving
a signal extraction problem.
We ￿t this model to a data set that includes U.S. per capita GDP and the U.S. GDP
de￿ ator. We obtain the following results. First, when one replaces the more popular Calvo
sticky pricing with the mechanism of imperfect common knowledge, the ￿t of the DSGE
model improves. Second, we ￿nd that the mechanism of imperfect common knowledge
improves upon that of sticky pricing in accounting for the persistence of real e⁄ects of
monetary disturbances. Third, in the estimated model the reaction of real variables to
nominal shocks is very persistent, since ￿rms are found to be rather uninformed about the
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That ￿rms are widely unaware about monetary policy stance raises interesting questions.
A natural question is: why do ￿rms disregard the variability of the monetary policy stance,
even though information about it seems to be cheaply available in advanced economies?
According to the theory of rational inattention introduced by Sims (2003), free availability
of a piece of information does not necessarily mean that agents will decide to pay attention
to it. Hence, from a theoretical standpoint, the rational inattention theory seems to be
well-suited to explaining why ￿rms are uninformed about monetary policy even though it
would be very cheap for them to become informed.
To further investigate this issue, we present a simpli￿ed rational inattention model that is
nested into the model with imperfect common knowledge. Moreover, we introduce an econo-
metric procedure that allows us to assess whether the predictions of this rational inattention
model are supported by the data. We ￿nd that its predictions are rejected to some extent
by the data. We point out that it is worthwhile to redo this exercise with a full-￿ edged
model of rational inattention, where the signal process is less parametrically restricted (e.g.,
Ma· ckowiak and Wiederholt, forthcoming) or ￿rms￿pro￿t function is less stylized (e.g., al-
lowing ￿rms to accumulate capital). But the lack of fast and automated routines to solve
rational inattention models is a bottleneck that must be relieved in order to be able to do
this exercise.
Finally, when we solve the model with information frictions, we restrict signals to be
Gaussian. Sims (2006) and Lewis (2008) warn that, in models with rational inattention, such
an assumption has a signi￿cant impact on agents￿behavior, especially if information frictions
are large. Thus, considering non-Gaussian signals is likely to a⁄ect the predictions of models
with information-processing frictions. Nonetheless, some of these expansions may involve
substantial technical complications. For instance, solving models with non-Gaussian signal
noise may require using sequential Monte Carlo ￿lters (FernÆndez-Villaverde and Rubio-
Ram￿rez, 2007).A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 32
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Tables and Figures (intended for publication)
Table 1: Prior distributions
Name Range Density Median 90% Interval
￿￿ [0;1) Beta 0:50 [0:18;0:83]
lna R Normal 0:00 [￿0:41;0:41]
￿￿ R Normal 0:00 [￿0:41;0:41]
￿ R+ Gamma 6:67 [0:78;12:31]
100￿￿ R+ InvGamma 8:60 [1:60;46:60]
100￿a R+ InvGamma 0:70 [0:51;0:87]
100￿e1 R+ InvGamma 18:52 [12:66;25:63]
100￿e2 R+ InvGamma 1:00 [0:34;2:63]
￿ [0;1) Beta 0:99 [0:98;0:99]
￿p [0;1) Beta 0:67 [0:50;0:83]A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 36
Table 2: Posterior distributions
ICK Model Calvo Model
Name Median 95% Interval Median 95% Interval
￿￿ 0:24 [0:14;0:34] 0:06 [0:04;0:08]
100lna 0:45 [0:36;0:55] 0:44 [0:29;0:59]
100￿￿ 1:69 [1:39;1:98] 1:85 [1:49;2:19]
￿ 1:80 [1:39;2:21] 2:16 [1:56;2:73]
100￿￿ 1:57 [1:23;1:92] 1:93 [1:41;2:44]
100￿a 0:75 [0:58;0:90] 1:24 [0:99;1:48]
100￿e1 36:82 [20:74;52:21] ￿ ￿
100￿e2 2:45 [1:37;3:45] ￿ ￿
￿ 0:99 [0:98;0:99] 0:99 [0:99;0:99]
￿p ￿ ￿ 0:94 [0:92;0:95] ￿
1 ￿ ￿
￿1￿
0:44 [0:31;0:56] ￿ ￿
￿e1=￿￿ 22:40 [15:56;31:26] ￿ ￿
￿e2=￿a 3:16 [2:43;4:04] ￿ ￿
￿m 0:04 [0:03;0:06] ￿ ￿
￿a 0:23 [0:17;0:29] ￿ ￿
{ 0:27 [0:21;0:34] ￿ ￿
￿a 0:84 [0:80;0:89] ￿ ￿
We use every 1,000 posterior draws to compute the posterior moments of ￿m, ￿a,
{, and ￿aA Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 37
Table 3: Logarithms of Marginal Data Densities (MDDs)
Models
ICK Calvo VAR(4)
log MDD 1539:01 1530:36 1727:04
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Appendix (not for publication)
A Log-linear approximation of the Calvo model
Here the equilibrium equations of the Calvo model are presented:
c mct = b yt (54)
b pt + ￿b yt = 0 (55)
^ wt ￿ ^ yt = 0 (56)
￿at = ￿a"a;t (57)
￿mt = ￿￿￿mt￿1 + ￿￿"￿;t (58)
^ ￿t = ￿Et^ ￿t+1 + ￿pc mct ￿  p [￿￿at ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿mt] (59)
b ￿t = b pt ￿ b pt￿1 (60)
and
￿p ￿


















where the subscript b means log-deviations of a variable from its ￿ exible-price steady-state
value, and mct denotes real marginal costs.A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 42
B Solving the models with information frictions
In section B.1, we introduce some notation in order to be able to refer to ￿rms￿higher-order
beliefs. In section B.2, we outline how one can apply the method introduced by Woodford
(2002) to solve the ICK model. We need to solve this model in order to evaluate the likelihood
function. In section B.3, we present a method that solves the rational inattention model.
We have to solve this model in order to characterize the restriction mapping ￿R in equation
(41).
B.1 Notation of high-order beliefs
Let us consider an arbitrary stochastic variable xt. Firm i￿ s expectations of order zero are
the variable itself, i.e., x
(0)
t (i) ￿ xt. Firm i￿ s ￿rst-order expectations are denoted as
x
(1)















Firm i￿ s second-order expectations are ￿rm i￿ s ￿rst-order expectations of the average
￿rst-order expectations, or more concisely
x
(2)

















Moreover, ￿rm i￿ s (m + 1)-th order expectations are its expectations of the average m-th
order expectation,A Likelihood Anaylsis of Models with Information Frictions 43
x
(m+1)
t (i) ￿ x
(m)


















t (i) + ￿
￿1 ln￿
(1)
t (i) ￿ lnA
(1)





t (i), and lnA
(1)
t (i) stand for ￿rm i￿ s ￿rst-order expectations of lnPt,
ln￿t, and lnAt, respectively.

















t , and lnA
(1)
t are the average ￿rst-order expectations of lnPt, ln￿t, and
lnAt, respectively.
Iterating on equation (70) by repeatedly taking conditional expectations and averaging

















B.2 Solving the ICK model
For a given set of parameters ￿I, the transition equations of the ICK model are:
b yt = ￿￿
￿1b pt (72)
b pt = r
0Xt (73)
Xt = BXt￿1 + but (74)






















































; ut = ["￿;t;"a;t]
0 (79)
ut
iid v N (0;I2), for all t (80)
where I2 is a 2 ￿ 2 identity matrix,
G = e kB
y; d = e k￿
1
2; H = B ￿ e kB
y (81)





































and Bj stands for the j-th row of B and k is the steady-state
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with ￿e de￿ned as in (21) for the ICK model. The variance and covariance matrix P solves













A loop to numerically ￿nd an REE for the ICK model is as follows. Given a set of
parameter values and a guess for the Kalman-gain matrix k0, one has to characterize the
matrices G, H, and d. Then, one has to solve the algebraic Riccati equation (86) for
P and to obtain a new Kalman-gain matrix k￿ through equation (85). Then if the new
Kalman-gain matrix is su¢ ciently close to the guess, one has just found the ￿xed point and
stops; otherwise, one goes through another loop by using the matrix k￿ as a new guess for
the Kalman-gain matrix. Once a ￿xed point is found, one can use the resulting Kalman-
gain matrix in order to fully characterize the state-space system described in (72)-(84).
Computationally, ￿nding this ￿xed point turns out to be very fast and this makes the ICK
model suitable for estimation.
B.3 Solving the rational inattention model
The following algorithm allows one to solve the rational inattention model. Given a set of
parameter values for ￿R,
1. GUESS: Guess ￿e1 and ￿e2.
2. DETERMINING THE EQUILIBRIUM TRANSITION EQUATION OF
FIRMS￿STATE SPACE MODEL: Use the parameter values:
f￿;￿￿;￿;lna;￿
￿;￿;￿;￿￿;￿ag ￿ ￿R
as well as the guessed parameters ￿e1 and ￿e2 to apply the method shown in Appendix
A1. Store the variance-covariance matrix P, de￿ned in equation (86).
3. SOLVE FIRMS￿ATTENTION PROBLEM: Solve the quadratic approximation












































i;t is the log of optimal price set by ￿rm i at time t under perfect information








￿1 ln￿t ￿ lnAt + ￿
￿1 ln ￿ p (89)
















































All these conditional variances and covariances are obtained from the matrix P that













0. Moreover, denote the (i;j) element of the matrix P as



























= P(4;3) ￿ P(6;3)
Finally, from equations (30)-(33), we observe that the information-processing con-
straint (88) can also be numerically characterized by using the matrix P from step
2.





￿ ￿ ", with j 2 f1;2g, and " > 0 small.
If this criterion is not satis￿ed, go back to step 1 by setting ￿ej = ￿￿
ej; j 2 f1;2g.
Otherwise stop.